When penalties for …rst-time o¤enders are restricted, it is typically optimal for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat o¤enders. First-time o¤enders are then deterred not only by the (restricted) …ne for a …rst o¤ense, but also by the prospect of a large …ne for a subsequent o¤ense. Now suppose the restriction on penalties for …rst-time o¤enders is relaxed; i.e., larger …nes for a …rst offense become enforceable. Should overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders now be reduced? We show that this is the case only if the original restriction was not very strong. Otherwise, overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders should actually be further ampli…ed.
Introduction
The law often sanctions repeat o¤enders more severely than …rst-time o¤end-ers. 1 The literature has provided various justi…cations for the fact that the sanction imposed on an o¤ender depends on whether he was convicted previously.
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Some authors have argued that a record of prior o¤enses provides information about the o¤ender's characteristics (e.g., a higher-than-average propensity to commit crimes)
. 3 Yet, making sanctions depend on o¤ense history may be advantageous even when individuals are ex-ante identical such that there are no characteristics to be learned about. As emphasized by Shavell (2004, p. 529) , when "detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanction, but also a higher sanction for a future violation, an individual will be deterred more from committing a violation presently." In this paper, we follow Shavell's (2004) insight and further explore how penalties for repeat o¤enders should be designed when we take their e¤ect on the deterrence of …rst-time o¤enders into account.
Speci…cally, suppose that there is an exogenously given restriction on the penalties for …rst-time o¤enders; i.e., there is an upper limit l which a …ne for a …rst-time o¤ender must not exceed, while there is no (binding) restriction on the …ne that a repeat o¤ender has to pay. 4 In each of two periods, a potential o¤ender engages in an activity that may cause a harm h. When a harm is caused, the o¤ender is convicted to pay a …ne. If the harm is smaller than the maximum …ne l, then by setting the …ne equal to the harm h in both periods the negative externality of the activity is internalized and the …rst-best (i.e., socially optimal) activity level is implemented. Yet, if l < h, then …rst-time o¤enders in the …rst period are underdeterred, given that the …ne for repeat o¤enders is set equal to the harm h.
As a consequence, in general it will be optimal for the lawmaker to set the …ne for repeat o¤enders larger than h. While in the second period overdeterrence of 1 For example, with regard to civil penalties in the U.S.A., Shavell (2004, ch. 22) points out that for certain violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act there is a maximum …ne of $7,000 for a …rst o¤ense, while a repeat o¤ender may be …ned $70,000.
2 See Miceli (2013) for a recent literature review.
3 See e.g. Rubinstein (1980) , Rubinfeld (1991), and Chu et al. (2000) . 4 There may be various reasons why society does not accept larger penalties for …rst-time o¤enders. For instance, Stigler (1970, p. 528) has pointed out that a "…rst-time o¤ender may have committed the o¤ense almost accidentally" and Polinsky and Shavell (1998, p. 313) argue that "considerations of fairness might constrain the sanction imposed on …rst-time o¤enders but not on repeat o¤enders."
repeat o¤enders is ex-post ine¢ cient, the advantage of such a policy is that the large …ne for a second o¤ense has a spillover e¤ect on the …rst period. 5 Individuals in the …rst period are deterred not only by the (restricted) …ne that they have to pay when they cause harm as a …rst-time o¤ender, but also by the prospect of having to pay a large …ne as a repeat o¤ender in the second period.
Let us now explore what happens when the restriction l that society has put on the admissible …nes for …rst-time o¤enders is relaxed. At …rst sight, one might guess that the lawmaker should reduce the ex-post ine¢ cient overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders, because the deterrence of …rst-time o¤enders can now be improved by a larger penalty for …rst o¤enses. Yet, it turns out that this is the case only if initially the upper limit l was not very restrictive. If l was very small, then an increase in l will actually prompt the lawmaker to further increase the …ne for repeat o¤enders; i.e., overdeterrence of second o¤enses will be further aggravated.
Intuitively, when l is very small, then a …rst-time o¤ender in the second period faces only a very small …ne, which provides indirect incentives in the …rst period not to cause a harm. Now consider an increase in l, such that a …rst-time o¤ender in the second period can be more severely punished. When the …ne for a repeat o¤ender does not go up, then the indirect incentives in the …rst period are reduced, which the lawmaker may prefer to o¤set by further increasing the …ne for repeat o¤enders. 
The model
In each of two consecutive periods, t = 1; 2, a risk-neutral individual chooses the level a t 2 [0; 1] of a potentially harmful activity. With probability a t the individual causes a harm h > 0 in period t. 7 For simplicity, assume that whenever 5 Note that related spillover-of-incentives e¤ects also occur in sequential moral hazard models with limited liability. See e.g. Schmitz (2005) and Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012) , who show how second-period rents may act as carrot and stick for an agent's …rst-period e¤ort choice, such that optimal contracts exhibit memory even though the periods are technologically independent.
Recent papers that exploit related e¤ects include e.g. Kräkel and Schöttner (2010) , Tsai and Kung (2011 ), Chen and Chiu (2013 ), and Pi (2014 .
a harm is caused, the individual is convicted to pay a …ne. 8 The individual's private bene…t from pursuing the activity is b(a) :
Let y 2 f0; 1g denote the individual's o¤ense history at the beginning of period t = 2. If y = 1, then the individual is pre-convicted because he caused a harm h in period t = 1. If y = 0, the individual has a clean slate. In period t = 0 the lawmaker commits to a constitution, in particular stipulating the (…nite) …ne F t 0 to be paid by an individual in period t if he causes a harm. While the …ne in period t = 2 may condition on the individual's o¤ense history,
the lawmaker is not allowed to discriminate according to whether a …rst o¤ense was committed in t = 1 or t = 2. 9 Thus,
Moreover, while there is no (binding) restriction regarding the punishment F 1 of a repeat o¤ender, by social convention punishment of a …rst-time o¤ender must not be overly drastic, F 0 l, where l 0.
If the activity level in each period were directly enforceable, then the lawmaker would implement the activity levels that maximize the expected social surplus
, where
Thus, the …rst-best solution is given by a 1 = a 2 = a F B > 0, where a F B is implicitly
The Analysis
In period t = 2, an individual with o¤ense history y 2 f0; 1g chooses the
denotes an individual's expected utility from activity level a when facing …ne F in case of a harm. The second-period activity level that is optimal for the individual
examples with a 2 [0; 1) such that our main insights still hold. Hence, the upper bound on a is not crucial.
with da 2 (F y )=dF y = 1=b 00 (a 2 (F y )) < 0; i.e., the higher the …ne, the lower the individual's optimal activity level. Note that U (a; h) = S(a), hence a 2 (F y ) a 
In period t = 1, the individual chooses his activity level a 1 2 [0; 1] in order to maximize his overall expected utility,
which is strictly concave,
…rst-period activity level is characterized by the …rst-order condition
In the latter case, application of the envelope theorem yields that the individual's activity level is strictly decreasing in both the …ne for …rst-time o¤enders and the …ne for repeat o¤enders, @a 1 (
Anticipating the individual's behavior, the lawmaker's problem at date t = 0 amounts to setting …nes F 0 l and F 1 in order to maximize the expected welfare
Making use of (3) and (5), the partial derivatives of the expected welfare are given by
and
We now characterize the penalties F 0 and F 1 that the lawmaker will stipulate at date t = 0.
Proposition 1. If l h, the lawmaker sets
When the lawmaker sets F 0 = F 1 = h, then in the second period the individual will exert the socially desirable activity level a 2 (h) = a F B irrespective of his o¤ense history. Since his second-period utility does not depend on his o¤ense history, according to (5) the individual's …rst-period activity level is purely determined by the …ne F 0 = h for …rst-time o¤enders, so the individual chooses the socially desirable activity level also in the …rst period, a 1 (h; h) = a F B . Now consider the case in which the restriction on penalties for …rst-time offenders becomes relevant. We …rst establish that repeat o¤enders are punished at least as hard as …rst-time o¤enders; i.e., decreasing punishment schemes are never optimal.
Lemma 1. If l < h, the lawmaker sets
Note that harsher punishment of repeat o¤enders implies that U (a 2 (F 0 );
Hence, the individual's …rst-period activity is characterized by (5), such that @a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 )=@F y < 0 for y 2 f0; 1g. Moreover, with lim a!1 b 0 (a) = 0, U (a; F ) is bounded from above, such that lim a!0 b 0 (a) = 1 implies that a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 ) > 0 must hold.
Next, Lemma 1, (7), and (8) imply that whenever 0 < l < h, optimal sentencing requires F 1 > h and thus overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders, i.e.,
The prospect of a larger …ne that the individual may have to pay in the future helps to deter him from choosing an overly large activity level in the present.
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Proposition 2. (i) If l 2 (0; h), the lawmaker sets
Finally, observe that the lawmaker optimally imposes maximum punishment for …rst-time o¤enders.
10 Note that if l = 0, the indirect e¤ect of the second-period prospects on the …rst-period incentives is already strong enough such that the lawmaker prefers not to make use of overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders. Intuitively, one might think that when l = 0, then increasing F 1 above h should be welfare-improving. After all, in the second period there would only be a second-order loss given that y = 1 (and no e¤ect given y = 0), while in the …rst period there would be a …rst-order gain. Yet, this reasoning neglects the fact that y = 0 (leading to a smaller second-period welfare than y = 1) becomes more likely when F 1 is increased (and hence a 1 is reduced).
Proposition 3. If l < h, the lawmaker sets
In what follows, assume that there is a unique interior solution regarding the choice of F 1 . Under the optimal punishment scheme, there is a non-monotonic relationship between the maximum punishment of …rst-time o¤enders and the optimal punishment of repeat o¤enders.
Corollary 1. There exist l and l with 0 < l < l < h, such that Figure 2 . The …rst-period activity level is a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 ), while the second-period activity level is a 2 (F 1 ) or a 2 (F 0 ), depending on whether or not the individual was previously convicted.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given in the text.
Proof of Lemma 1.
We proceed by contradiction. First, suppose that
Now consider an increase in the …ne for repeat o¤enders
is left unchanged and, as long asF 1 is su¢ ciently
, thereby strictly increasing the value of the lawmaker's objective. In consequence,
Next, suppose that
increases overall expected total surplus,
contradicting the original choice of …nes to be optimal.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) From Lemma 1, in the optimum we must have F 0 F 1 . Distinguishing four di¤erent cases, we proceed by contradiction.
First, suppose that F 0 2 (0; l] and
which contradicts F 0 2 (0; l] and F 1 2 [F 0 ; h] to be optimal.
Second, suppose that F 0 = 0 and
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 2 (0; h] to be optimal.
Third, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 = 0 is optimal. In this case, a 1 (
which contradicts F 0 = F 1 = 0 to be optimal.
Finally, suppose that F 0 = 0 and
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 = h to be optimal.
(ii) To see that F 1 = h is optimal for l = 0, note that a 2 (F 0 ) = a 2 (0) = 1.
From (8), we have
The desired result then follows from the fact that @W (0;
Proof of Proposition 3.
In the remainder of the proof, we consider l > 0.
First, with F 1 > h by Proposition 2, F 0 = 0 cannot be optimal because in this case a 2 (F 0 ) = 1 and a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 ) < 1 such that
Hence, overall expected total surplus could be increased by reducing F 1 , which makes F 0 = 0 incompatible with optimality.
Next, suppose that 0 < F 0 < l is optimal, i.e., the constraint F = 0 have to be jointly satis…ed. From (7) and (8), this requires
where a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 ) 2 (0; 1), and da 2 (F y )=dF y < 0 and @a 1 (F 0 ; F 1 )=@F y < 0 for F y 2 fF 0 ; F 1 g. With F 0 < l < h by hypothesis, a necessary condition for (16) to hold is that F 1 < h. According to Proposition 2, however, F 1 < h cannot be optimal, which contradicts F 0 < l to be optimal.
Proof of Corollary 1.
With F 0 = l the optimal …ne for repeat o¤enders is characterized by 
Implicit di¤erentiation of (17) with respect to l yields
(1 a 2 (l)) da 2 (l) dF 0 (l h)
For l = 0 we have a 2 (0) = 1 and F 1 = h such that (18) becomes
Likewise, for l = h we have F 1 = h such that (18) 
Combining (19) and (22) reveals that dF 1 =dlj l=0 > 0. Likewise, combining (20) and (23) yields dF 1 =dlj l=h < 0. The results stated in the corollary then follow from continuity.
